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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 03-2610
____________
ROSA DIAZ,
Appellant
v.
COMM ISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court Judge: Joel A. Pisano
(D.C. Civ. No: 01-cv-02502)
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 29, 2004
Before: NYGAARD, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges,
and O’NEILL * , District Judge.
(Opinion Filed: February 24, 2004)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________

*

Hon. Thomas O’Neill, U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
sitting by designation.
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
The appellant, Rosa Diaz, appeals from an order of the District Court affirming the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). We conclude that
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, and therefore, we will affirm.
I
Rosa Diaz applied for DIB and SSI on December 2, 1996, alleging disability
beginning on June 1, 1991, pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The
Social Security Administration determined that Diaz was not disabled as of June 30,
1995. The application was accordingly denied, and Diaz sought review before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
Diaz is a divorced mother of two. A high school graduate, she was employed as a
bookkeeper from 1981 to 1989. She stopped working in June 1991 claiming symptoms of
HIV and was later diagnosed with HIV on April 1, 1993. Diaz was also diagnosed with
Hepatitis C in 1996.
In addition to HIV and Hepatitis C, Diaz has experienced pulmonary problems,
chronic liver disease, asthma, cervical candidiasis, fever, night sweats, chronic diarrhea,
and stomach and side pain. She has also experienced diffuse wheezing in her lungs,
constipation, gastric discomfort, insomnia, and weight fluctuation. During the period
from July 1995 until April 1997, Diaz underwent pulmonary function testing which
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yielded results suggesting mild obstructive lung disease.
Regarding Diaz’s psychological condition, Arlene Diaz, a substance abuse
counselor, concluded that Rosa Diaz was “doing well in all areas of her life.” Dr. Linda
Cameron, a psychiatrist who had treated Diaz for depression and other personality
disturbances, found symptoms indicating depression, despair, anxiety, emotional
outbursts and confusion. As a result of her physical and mental impairments as well as
her past intravenous drug use, Diaz has been taking a variety of medications.
On September 13, 1996, Diaz’s physician, Dr. Stephen Manocchio, completed a
medical report indicating that she had no restrictions or limitations on daily activities. On
January 15, 1997, a state agency medical consultant reviewed Diaz’s records and
determined that she was capable of lifting ten pounds, occasionally twenty pounds, could
sit, stand or walk for six hours out of an eight-hour workday, and had no postural or
communicative limitations. This opinion was independently reviewed and determined to
be accurate by another state medical consultant.
Based on Diaz’s medical records and testimony, the Administrative Law Judge
concluded that Diaz is not entitled to receive Social Security and Disability benefits.
First, he held that although Diaz suffers from HIV, Hepatitis C, asthma and other
impairments, these illnesses do not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments
listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations. (20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1).
Next, the ALJ concluded that Diaz’s impairments do not preclude her from
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performing her past work as she performed it or as it is performed in the national
economy. Specifically, the ALJ determined that the objective evidence showed that Diaz
could perform light exertional work and that although Diaz’s past relevant work required
her to lift up to twenty pounds, it is generally performed at the national level in a
sedentary manner. Therefore, at least in a modified way, Diaz could continue working.
The ALJ officially denied Diaz’s application on August 22, 1998, at which point
Diaz sought review in the Appeals Council. After the Appeals Council declined to
review the application, Diaz filed this suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, which affirmed the decision of the ALJ on March 31, 2003.
Thereafter, Diaz filed this timely appeal.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over Diaz’s request for review of the
Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). Because the District Court’s
order was a final judgment, we exercise jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the issue of whether the Commissioner’s denial of
benefits was supported by substantial evidence. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d
Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that is more than a mere scintilla,
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); but affirmation is warranted if this
Court decides that the decision of the Commissioner is reasonably supported by the
evidence, without attention to whether this Court would have decided differently.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938), (defining substantial
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evidence as, “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion”).
II
Diaz sets forth two arguments in her appeal of the Commissioner’s decision. First,
she maintains that the administrative decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
More specifically, Diaz claims that the decision violates this Court’s own Cotter Doctrine,
set forth in Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981) (Cotter I) and refined in
Cotter v. Harris, 650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981) (Cotter II), by failing to address
relevant evidence and by rendering its judgment “without the slightest evidentiary basis or
articulated explanation.” Diaz Br. at 2 (citing Cotter I, 642 F.2d at 705). We disagree.
Diaz is correct in asserting that Cotter I requires the ALJ to give some indication
of the evidence that was rejected. However, as Cotter II clarified, Cotter I “simply
requires that the ALJ indicate that s/he has considered all the evidence . . . and provide
some explanation of why s/he has rejected probative evidence which would have
suggested a contrary disposition.” Cotter II at 482.
Diaz claims that the ALJ dismissed her psychiatric impairments and the opinions
of her physicians, refused to detail her complaints and omitted evidence of her
medications, all without justification. This claim is unfounded. The ALJ discussed the
opinions of Diaz’s physicians, nurse and social worker as well as the opinions of two
State Agency medical consultants, both of whom had reviewed Diaz’s medical records.
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None of these opinions indicated that Diaz’s condition prevented her from working.
More specifically, Diaz takes issue with the lack of weight given by the ALJ to the
opinion of Diaz’s psychiatrist, Dr. Cameron. We find, however, that the ALJ adequately
outlined Dr. Cameron’s opinion and sufficiently explained his reason for according it
little weight, including the contradictory opinion of Diaz’s substance abuse counselor that
Diaz’s mood was normal and that her thoughts were organized and coherent. This meets
the standard set out in Cotter I.
Diaz also contends that the ALJ refused to detail all of her complaints and omitted
mention of her medications. While it is true that the ALJ did not include an exhaustive
list of Diaz’s complaints, the ALJ indicated that he had considered Diaz’s complaints and
gave reasons for rejecting them, one of the reasons being that he believed Diaz lacked
credibility.
The ALJ has the authority to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Van Horn v.
Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983). The ALJ found that based on objective
medical evidence such as CD4 counts, weight stability and the opinions of her physicians,
and based on her own testimony as to the extent of her daily activities, Diaz’s actual
condition was inconsistent with her complaints.
Even still, if the witness’s subjective complaints are substantiated by medical
evidence, the ALJ may not conclude that the witness lacks credibility without
contradictory medical evidence. Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1070 (3d Cir.
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1984). In the present case, Diaz’s subjective complaints are not unequivocally supported
by the medical evidence. Although some evidence exists that could substantiate Diaz’s
complaints, for each supporting piece of medical evidence there exists either
contradictory medical evidence or a contradictory interpretation of the same medical
evidence. Not only did the ALJ indicate the basis for his decision to discount Diaz’s
credibility, but he also listed the contradictory medical evidence used to discount the
medical evidence offered by Diaz.
Next, although the ALJ did not list Diaz’s medications by name, he did note
generally that she was taking medications. The ALJ was not required to indicate with
specificity each medication in Diaz’s regimen. The Social Security Administration’s
approach to determining disability focuses on impairments as criteria, not medications.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404. The existence of a medicinal regimen does little to persuade this
Court as to the extent of Diaz’s disability, especially considering the existence of the
more objective standards required by §404.
Diaz’s second contention is that the ALJ’s finding at step three of the sequential
evaluation was not supported by substantial evidence. At step three, the ALJ compares
“the medical evidence of the claimant’s impairment . . . to a list of impairments presumed
severe enough to preclude any gainful work.” If the claimant’s impairment matches or is
“equal” to one of the listed impairments, he qualifies for benefits without further inquiry.
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1063 (3d Cir. 1993). Diaz claims that the ALJ did not
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adequately state his reason for finding that she did not meet any of the criteria listed in 20
C.F.R. § 404. Diaz argues that she meets three §404 Listings, any one of which entitles
her to disability benefits. These are Listings: 14.08D(5), 14.08B(2), and 14.08N, of 20
C.F.R. § 404. We must consider whether the ALJ adequately addressed Diaz’s arguments
and whether substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ’s decision.
In regard to Listing 14.08, the ALJ stated that Diaz “has not had one of the
associated infections, conditions, or abnormalities required by such listing nor has she
marked limitations in daily activities, social functioning, or difficulty in completing tasks
in a timely manner due to deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace.” Diaz App.
at A-25. Based on this statement, Diaz argues that the ALJ did not address the specific
subsections claimed. We cannot agree. Although the ALJ’s remarks fail to explicitly
name each specific listing within §404 argued by Diaz, his referencing of the criteria for
those listings is an adequate indicator that these listings were, in fact, considered.
Listing 14.08B(2) covers certain types of candidiasis which give rise to disability.
Candidiasis is one of the “associated infections” referred to by the ALJ in his decision
and properly rejected by him as Diaz does not meet the listed criteria.
The ALJ also addressed the argument that Diaz is covered by Listing 14.08N. To
qualify under Listing 14.08N, a claimant must prove his or her repeated manifestations of
HIV resulting in significant, documented symptoms and either a marked restriction in
daily living, social functioning or task completion. In regard to whether Diaz was
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covered under Listing 14.08N, the ALJ stated that Diaz has not “[had] marked limitations
in daily activities, social functioning, or difficulty in completing tasks. . .”
Lastly, the argument that the ALJ did not adequately address Diaz’s claim that she
is entitled to benefits under Listing 14.04D(5), which grants disability to those suffering
from HIV and Hepatitis under specific circumstances, is without merit. The ALJ
explicitly addressed Diaz’s claim in his decision by referencing Listing 5.05, the criteria
for chronic liver disease. On Diaz’s counsel’s own admission Diaz fails to meet the
criteria for coverage under this Listing.
The second part of Diaz’s claim with regards to Listings 14.08D(5), 14.08B(2),
and 14.08N, of 20 C.F.R. § 404, is that the ALJ’s denial of coverage based on this section
is not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ stated in his decision that he reviewed
Diaz’s medical reports and subjective complaints. These records contain evidence
showing that Diaz does not meet the standards for chronic liver disease, 14.08D(5),
candidiasis, 14.08B (2), or the Commissioner’s “catch-all,” 14.08N. We conclude that
this evidence was sufficient to support the ALJ’s decision.
III
Upon a careful review of the entire record, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of
disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income Benefits.
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